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NOTES
WARD v. ROCK AGAINST RACISM: HOW TIME,
PLACE AND MANNER FURTHER
RESTRICT THE PUBLIC FORUM
INTRODUCTION
Of the numerous ideas that form the core of American conscious-
ness, it is the constitutional paradigm that provides a foundation for
our society. The Framers - names handed down in history books as
the inspiration for a nation - created a constitution. Whether it re-
tains the meaning that Adams, Jefferson and their colleagues in-
tended is the subject of continuing scholarship within and without
the legal community. Of all the Framers, James Madison most pro-
foundly influenced the rights guaranteed to United States citizens.
His Bill of Rights articulated fundamental notions of individual lib-
erty implicit within the evolving American polity. None have had
more impact than those guarantees contained in the first
amendment.1
Often the first amendment is misconstrued as an affirmative guar-
antee of rights. In fact, it operates only as a prohibition on Con-
gress, subsequently applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.2 The Constitution's proscription of laws abridging free
speech explains, in part, judicial focus on the legality of state regu-
lations inhibiting freedom of expression. The "public forum" doc-
trine emerged in the 1930's and 1940's when the Supreme Court, in
a series of suits brought mainly by the Jehovah's Witnesses, held that
"leafleting, parading, and other speech-related uses of streets, side-
walks, and parks could be neither banned nor subjected to discre-
tionary licensing."3  The doctrine's subsequent interpretations,
1. U.S. Const. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Section 1. "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdicition thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
3. L. TRBE, AMmucAs CoNsTrruTONAL Liw 986, n.2 (2d ed. 1988). See Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943);
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
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however, do not reflect the forthright standard handed down at its
inception. In truth, the Court has been plagued by its inability to
apply the doctrine's tests consistently to the numerous fact patterns it
has encountered. Years later, the law resembles nothing but flux
and contradiction and ultimately, confusion.
Nowhere is this more evident than "the time, place and manner
restrictions" branch of the public forum doctrine. Classical time,
place and manner restrictions, in forums public and nonpublic, re-
strict access to the forum based on the time when the speech is to be
delivered, the place where speech is to be heard, or the manner of
expression involved.4 The Court, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism'
(hereinafter Rock Against Racism), made a noble attempt to resolve
the ambiguities in its application of time, place and manner restric-
tions, holding that the "least intrusive means" test lies without the
constitutional analysis traditionally applied to such restrictions.
Part I of this Note will discuss the "public forum" doctrine and
focus on time, place and manner restrictions. Part II addresses the
Court's interpretation of these restrictions in Rock Against Racism
and analyzes its impact on traditional applications of the doctrines.
Part III of this Note will apply this Court's standard of scrutiny of
time, place and manner restrictions to the facts of a prior case to
identify whether the test Justice Kennedy articulated in Rock
Against Racism would change its result. This Note concludes with
recommendations designed to clarify a cluttered area of constitu-
tional law and reduce its speculative nature.
I. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE AND ITS




To understand the nuances of the public forum doctrine today, the
clock must be turned back decades to a post-Depression American
(1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496
(1939).
4. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). In assessing rea-
sonable time, place and manner restrictions, the Court in Grayned set forth valid
examples that isolated each aspect of a proper restriction. Id. at 115-17. Justice
Marshall concluded that the "crucial question is whether the manner of expression
is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particu-
lar time." Id. at 116. But cf., L. TRm, at 994 n.50, who questions whether the Court
in Grayned actually 'applied an incompatibility standard, or merely articulated
one.
5. 491 U.S. 781 (1989), reh'g denied, 110 S.Ct. 23 (1989). Since the official
United States Reporter has not published this opinion, all subsequent references to
this case will cite the Supreme Court Reporter citation - 109 S.Ct. 2746 (1989).
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yesterday. The first amendment as yet had not become the watch-
tower of individual liberties; at least its parameters remained largely
untested by the judiciary. While a world watched the German jug-
gernaut launch its war machine, a seminal battle began in the court-
rooms of the United States. To what lengths did liberty go? So
asked Jehovah's Witnesses as they challenged a New Jersey ordi-
nance prohibiting distribution of their circulars.'
In Schneider v. State, Justice Roberts identified the foundation of
the public forum: "Tihe streets are natural and proper places for
the dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not to have
the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."17
Roberts' opinion ushered in a new era in constitutional theory and,
in effect, established concrete protections against state regulation
the exercise of speech.
The Jehovah's Witnesses returned to court frequently to adjudi-
cate their rights. In Martin v. City of Struthers,' Justice Black further
explored the protective scope of the first amendment. Black inti-
mated a proletariat philosophy underlying the public forum doc-
trine by affirming that door to door distribution is "essential to the
poorly financed causes of the little people."9 His not too subtle ref-
erence to the "little people" of the world repeatedly appears
throughout Supreme Court analysis of the public forum. Not surpris-
ingly, Black found the statute to be invalid because it failed to safe-
guard the constitutional rights of free speech and press.
In Cox v. New Hampshire,10 however, Chief Justice Hughes up-
6. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Schneider involved a challenge to
municipal ordinances in the cities of Los Angeles, Califorinia; Milwaukee, Wiscon-
sin; Worcester, Massachusetts; and Irvington, New Jersey.
7. Id. at 163. [Each city's] primary motive in enacting the prohibitive legisla-
tion was the "prevention of littering of the streets," and although nothing in the
record showed the Jehovah's Witnesses to be guilty of littering, [Los Angeles] ar-
gued that their distributions "encouraged or resulted in such littering." Id. at 162.
In contrast, the Irvington ordinance was designed to guard against fraudulent
solicitation.
8. 319 U.S. 141 (1943). Black cited no less an authority than Thomas Jefferson
on the Framers' intent for the expressive freedoms guaranteed by the first amend-
ment. Jefferson wrote Lafayette: "The force of public opinion cannot be resisted,
when permitted freely to be expressed. The agitation it produces must be submit-
ted to. It is necessary to keep the waters pure." Id. at "143 n.3.
9. Id. at 146. Black viewed the issue in this case to be a balancing of conflict-
ing interests: (1) the individual's civil rights to distribute information, (2) the indi-
vidual homeowner's right to determine whether he or she will receive such
information, and (3) the community's interest in protecting, through regulation, the
interest of its citizens. Id. at 143. Black ultimately concluded that the community's
interest in prohibiting distribution did not outweigh an individual's right to commu-
nicate. Id. at 149.
10. 312 U.S. 569 (1941). In Cox, the Jehovah's Witnesses met at city hall to
engage in an information march. At choice spots throughout the city, the defend-
1991]
154 Entertainment, Media & Intellectual Property Law Forum [Vol. 1
held a state provision requiring a license to conduct a parade on a
public street. Hughes argued that a municipality's authority to con-
trol the use of its public streets must include considerations of the
time, place, and manner in which those streets will be used." The
opinion represents the Court's initial validation of time, place and
manner restrictions, and as such, provides clues to their purpose.
The very least that can be said with confidence is that these restric-
tions were upheld because they did not unduly interfere with free
speech - the touchstone of a debate which has vexed the Court
ever since. 12
2. Public Forum Doctrine: Its Nuts and Bolts
The Court, in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educa-
tors' Association,13 established three categories of fora: (1) tradi-
tional public forums; (2) limited purpose or quasi-public forums; and
(3) nonpublic forums.' 4 Justice White identified traditional public
fora as streets and parks which have "immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions."'" In such forums, Justice White
argued that the government may not prohibit all communicative ac-
tivity, and therefore, the State's interest in enforcing a content-based
regulation must be compelling.' 6
ants marched single file along the sidewalks with signs. Id. at 572. The New
Hampshire statute prohibited parades without a license. Id. at 571. Chief Justice
Hughes held that the statute, as applied by the state court, did not contravene any
constitutional right. Id. at 576.
11. Id. at 576.
12. The public forum doctrine included two other major segments which I have
called the "Noisy Speaker Cases" and the "Demonstration Cases." The former in-
clude Seia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949). Kovacs held that a city ordinance prohibiting the use on public streets of
"loud" and "raucous" sound trucks does not deny freedom of speech in violation of
the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 87. The latter include Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559 (1965), Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), and National
Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977). Cox reversed a conviction of nearly
2000 black students for obstructing a public passageway near a courthouse, but
left open the possibility that a nondiscriminatory closing of streets and other public
facilities to parades might be permissible.
13. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
14. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-48. Perry's essential problem revolved around a pro-
vision in a collective bargaining agreement between a school district and its union
(Perry Education Association or PEA) giving that union exclusive access to teacher
mailboxes and the interschool mail system. A rival union (Perry Local Educators'
Association or PLEA) brought suit contending that PEA's preferential access to the
internal mail system violated the first amendment and the Equal Protection Clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 39-41.
15. Id. at 45. (citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
16. Id. In other words, Justice White's first category focuses on content-based
restrictions in a public forum; the regulation's goal is to restrict the message the
Ward v. Rock Against Racism
To be a quasi-public forum, the State opens public property for
use by the public as a place for expressive activity.1 7 Nothing re-
quires the State to keep the forum open, but so long as it does so, the
standards of the public forum doctrine apply to it. Nonpublic fo-
rums, the third category, consist of public property which is "not by
tradition or designation a forum for public communication .... 1
Here, the State may restrict speech so long as it is not an attempt to
suppress expression because the "public officials oppose the
speaker's view."19
Generally, whenever the Court is confronted with issues concern-
ing property access for expressive purposes, it will attempt to pig-
eonhole the facts within one of these three categories. The analysis
does not end here - the next stage usually amounts to an evaluation
of the regulation's purpose and whether it is based on content. 20 If
the regulation is content-based, the government must establish that
the regulation is necessary to support a compelling government in-
terest. If the regulation is content-neutral, however, the law be-
comes murky. The Supreme Court holds these regulations to an
amalgam of strict and intermediate scrutiny, but that language and
the resulting interpretation changes from case to case. When the
regulation at issue ignores content, the Court will inquire into "such
factors as the place of the speech, the character of the particular
activity being regulated, and the nature of the restriction im-
posed."' 21 These factors frequently give rise to time, place or man-
speaker wants to convey. Content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions, in
this context, are categorized separately, but will be discussed in depth infra.
17. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. Quasi-public fora include fairs and schoolgrounds
which the government opens to the public. The distinction turns on the fact that
government opens a facility traditionally closed to the public. L. TRIBE at 987. See
also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). Time, place and manner restrictions
also apply to quasi-public forums under Justice White's analysis.
18. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
19. Id. See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns.,
453 U.S. 114 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966).
The Court in Perry held that school mail facilities fall into the third category
because general school policies do not open such facilities to the general public;
therefore the internal mail system is not a traditional public forum. Moreover, the
Court found that use by such organizations as the YMCA and Cub Scouts does not
transform the mail system into a "limited" public forum. .460 U.S. at 46-47. Conse-
quently, a strict scrutiny standard does not apply to these facts and the School Dis-
trict need only show that the policy "rationally further[s] a legitimate state
purpose." Id. at 54.
20. Professor Laurence Tribe divided the analysis into two tracks. The first track
concerns content-based regulations where the government wishes to restrict speech
because of the message or idea it contains. Track-two focuses on content-neutral
restrictions - regulations blind to content, but nevertheless restricting the expres-
sion itself. TRIBE, at 977-78.
21. TRIBE, at 988.
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ner restrictions.
B. Time, Place and Manner Restrictions
1. The Four-Part Test
"[T]he essence of time, place or manner regulation lies in the rec-
ognition that various methods of speech, regardless of their content,
may frustrate legitimate governmental goals."' 22 Theoretical justifi-
cation for the "essence" of time, place and manner restrictions can
be found in earlier cases In Schneider,23 the Court expressly stated
that its decision did not prevent the town from fixing reasonable
hours when the Jehovah's Witnesses could canvass a neighborhood.
Moreover, the Court held in Cox 24 that a municipality's authority to
control the streets for parades and processions must include author-
ity to consider the "time, place and manner [of the activity] in rela-
tion to the other proper uses of the streets."' 25  Later Courts
established a multi-faceted test to give meaning to this language.
The test varies depending on the restriction's purpose, the forum's
nature and the breadth of the method employed,2 6 but the test at
bottom is less exacting than that afforded content-based
restrictions. 27
For present purposes, assuming the existence of a public forum,
the Court has established a four-part test for valid time, place and
manner restrictions. Essentially, the restriction must (1) be content-
22. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536
(1980)(regulation prohibiting controversial public policy inserts in monthly bills of
electric utility declared invalid).
23. See supra note 6, at 163-65.
24. See supra note 3.
25. 312 U.S. at 576.
26. L. TIBE at 988. See Note, Noncommercial Door-To-Door Solicitation and
the Proper Standard of Review for Municipal Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions,
55 FoRDmm L. Rzv. 1139, 1144-45 (1987). The author asserts a number of ratio-
nales for valid time, place and manner restrictions:
(1) "afford[s] the speaker the opportunity to deliver his message free from the
interference of other voices." See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115
(1972);
(2) "ensure[s] that the listener has the opportunity to receive clear messages"
(footnote omitted);
(3) facilitates the orderly flow of ideas which "enhances the overall effective-
ness of protected first amendment activity," see Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622, 642 (1951);
(4) "accommodate[s] the government's power to protect legitimate social inter-
ests and individual rights." (footnote omitted);
(5) "offer[s] the state the means of restricting expressive activity when necessary
to protect the community against crime and fraud, the individual against invasion of
his privacy as well as other societal interests." (footnotes omitted).
27. See Note, A Unitary Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to
Publicly Owned Property, 35 STAN. L. Rzv. 121, 125 (1982). See also Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980).
Ward v. Rock Against. Racism
neutral;2" (2) serve a significant government interest; (3) be nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest; and (4) leave open ample alter-
native modes of communication. 29 The restriction's validity further
hinges on each part of the test being independently satisfied.
Court decisions are in general agreement as to the meaning of
and the requirements necessary to satisfy the content-neutral prong
of the test. Its essence lies in its aim - not the content of expression,
but a desire to serve some "significant" governmental interest.3 0 To
be significant, an interest must not suppress speech based on the
content of the message;31 rather the governmental interest seeks, for
example, to protect national parks,32 advance esthetic concerns, 3
or guard citizens from crime, fraud and undue annoyance.3 4
Regulations most frequently fail the narrow tailoring prong of the
four part test. An ordinance is narrowly tailored when "the effect
[on first amendment freedoms] is no greater than necessary to ac-
complish the City's purpose."'3S In reality, much of the debate over
time, place and manner restrictions centers on the narrowness of the
regulation at issue. Generally, if the Court finds the regulation to
restrict more speech than is necessary, it will be struck down. In
contrast, if the Court finds that the regulation is designed to burden
28. "The Court has held that content-based restrictions generally are not permit-
ted under the first amendment because they are disruptive of the free and uncen-
sored flow of information to the public." Note, see supra note 26, at 1145 (footnote
omitted)(citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983);
Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95-97 (1977); Virginia
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976)). "The restrictions are permissible only when they are necessary to protect a
compelling state interest and are enforced only if they are the least restrictive
method of meeting that end. Id. at 1146 (footnotes omitted)(citing Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3448 (1985); United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270
(1981); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 & n. 20 (1967); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
29. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
30. See Note, supra note 26 at 1146 n.44. See also Consolidated Edison v.
Public Serv. Comn'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980). Here, the Court uses "signifi-
cant" as part of its standard. But see Heffron v. Intern. Soc. for Krishna Conscious-
ness, 452 U.S. 640, 654 (1981), where the Court holds that the time, place and
manner restriction must serve a "substantial state interest", and Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972), where the Court stated that the restriction
must serve the "State's legitimate interest."
31. Tmns at 988.
32. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288
(1984).
33. See, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
34. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620
(1980).
35. See Note, supra note 26, at 1147 n. 55.
1991]
158 Entertainment, Media & Intellectual Property Law Forum [Vol. 1
only that speech which must be burdened to serve the governmental
interest, the regulation survives constitutional challenge.
A final hurdle is that which requires "ample alternatives" to com-
munication to be left open. Usually equivalent to a judicial after-
thought, most courts quickly dispense with this prong because the
narrow tailoring requirement effectively swallows the necessity of
ample alternatives. Rarely (if ever) has the Court found a regulation
to be narrowly tailored and yet struck it down because ample alter-
natives to communicate were not left open.38 Yet, each Court that
considers the validity of a time, place or manner restriction mechan-
ically sifts through the facts to see if alternative opportunities to
communicate exist. The hurdle is not high and therefore affords lit-
tle additional protection to those seeking to express themselves in a
public forum.3 7 The State consequently need only point to other vi-
able means of communicating the desired speech. So long as the
other means is not unduly onerous, financially or otherwise, an am-
ple alternative remains open to the speaker.38
Presently, the Court tentatively agrees that these four factors de-
termine the validity of a time, place or manner regulation with re-
gard to a public forum. How each factor is applied often depends
36. The "ample alternatives" prong has received greater attention in commer-
cial speech cases. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S.
85, 93 (1977)(township ordinance banning "For Sale" and "Sold" signs from resi-
dential property held invalid under the first amendment); Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)(statutory
ban on advertising of prescription drug pricing held invalid under the first and
fourteenth amendment).
One commentator has argued that the significant government interest now famil-
iar to the time, place and manner test was borrowed from commercial speech cases.
It appears the Court also borrowed the ample alternatives standard from the com-
mercial speech cases and incorporated it into the time, place, and manner test. See
also Note, supra note 27, at 126.
37. See Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S at 294-97. In Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), the Court upheld a National Park Ser-
vice regulation that prohibited camping in certain parks, specifically Lafayette Park
and the Mall in Washington, D.C. According to Justice White, "It] he regulation
otherwise left the demonstration intact, with its symbolic city, signs, and the pres-
ence of those who were willing to take their turns in a day-and-night vigil. Respon-
dents do not suggest that there was, or is, any barrier to delivering to the media, or
to the public by other means, the intended message concerning the plight of the
homeless." Id. at 295.
38. L. TiuB, at 985. "The principle that government must incur affirmative costs
in order to facilitate commuicative activity is not lightly extended to cases in which
private individuals are asked to be cost-bearers. ... See also Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2760 (1989). In Rock Against Racism, the Court
upheld a New York City statute which restricted those seeking use of a Central Park
Bandshell to the equipment and technician the City provided. Justice Kennedy
wrote, "That the city's limitations on volume may reduce to some degree the poten-
tial audience for respondent's speech is of no consequence, for there has been no
showing that the remaining avenues of communication are inadequate." Id.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism
on who writes the opinion. Moreover, for over a decade, the Court
has debated whether another factor belongs in the analytical cruci-
ble. This factor is further complicated by its variety of aliases. Its
most popular version appears to be the "least restrictive means" test,
though that is by no means an authoritative conclusion. 9
2. Towards A Fifth Prong
One scholar has argued that the discussion of less restrictive alter-
natives in cases where content-neutral regulations are at issue is a
genuine part of the analysis itself: "the availability of such alterna-
tives is relevant to deciding whether government has in fact left too
little opportunity for communicative activity, whether for speakers
or for listeners."40 Given its relevance, the least restrictive means
test is derived in part from the "overbreadth doctrine". 41 Gener-
ally, where a statute is substantially overbroad - in this context bur-
dening more freedoms than necessary - the courts will strike it down.
Early case law, however, provides the roots of the concept, even
before it earned a name.
In Martin v. City of Struthers, partial justification for the Court's
decision revolved around the fact that distribution could "so easily
be controlled by traditional legal methods."'4 - In other words, the
law of trespass provided sufficient protection to the average home-
owner without constricting the Jehovah's Witnesses' right to dis-
tribute their information. Subsequent cases more fully developed
the idea until it became entrenched.4 3 Unfortunately, the passage
of time only served to skew the original design of the least restric-
tive means standard until few could say with confidence when or
why it applied. This sober truth further complicates an area already
full of doctrines, standards, and tests as interchangeable as the
machine tool.44 Justice Kennedy, in Ward v. Rock Against Ra-
39. Variations on this theme include: "least restrictive alternative", "least intru-
sive means", "less drastic means", "less drastic alternative", "less intrusive alterna-
tive", "precision of regulation", and "necessary means". See also Note, supra
note 26, at 1148 n. 57.
40. TRies at 985 (footnote omitted). Professor Tribe, however, cites only one
case in support of this conclusion - Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433
U.S. 425 (1977). The Court's recent decisions militate against this proposition,
although none of the decisions have commanded a decisive majority. But see Jus-
tice Marshall's dissent in CCNV, 468 U.S. at 313, which includes reference to a
context in which facially content-neutral regulations are nonetheless subjected to
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829
(1978)(regulation vests standardless discretion in state officials).
41. Tpmz at 1037. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 844, 917-18 (1970).
42. 319 U.S. at 147. See ThiBE at 1037.
43. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); see generally Note,
Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 Yale L.J. 464 (1969).
44. Attempts to decipher the puzzle confound legal scholars and neophytes
1991]
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cism,45 enunciated the Court's latest effort at resolving such
inconsistency.
II. WARD v. ROCK AGAINST RACISM: A NEW CHORD,
BUT THE SAME OLD SONG
A. The Facts
On June 22, 1989, the Supreme Court decided Ward v. Rock
Against Racism. 48 The facts of the case are crucial to the applica-
tion of the time, place and manner analysis. Rock Against Racism
(hereinafter RAR) is an unincorporated association "'dedicated to
the espousal of and promotion of antiracist views.' ,,41 It sponsors
speeches and rock concerts at the Naumberg Acoustic Bandshell in
Central Park in New York City. Previously, RAR supplied sound
equipment and a technician to the performing groups at the con-
certs. Over the years, the city received numerous complaints about
the noise from park users and nearby residents. The record indi-
cates RAR was uncooperative when the city requested it lower the
volume at its concerts.48
Prior to a 1984 concert, the city met with RAR where the two mu-
tually agreed that the city would monitor the noise level of RAR
sponsored events at the edge of the concert ground and would re-
voke their permit if specific limits were exceeded. During the con-
cert, the city repeatedly warned RAR about the noise level without
effect. The city then issued two citations for excessive volume.
When the city eventually shut off the power, "the audience became
abusive and disruptive."4 9
The next year, the city refused RAR a permit for the bandshell, but
suggested other city-operated facilities. Although discussion con-
tinued, RAR declined this offer and filed suit in the Federal District
Court for the Southern District against the city seeking an injunction
directing issuance of the permit. The parties eventually reached an
agreement after RAR agreed to abide by all applicable regulations;
alike. E.g. Do valid time, place and manner restrictions only occur within a public
forum? See, e.g., Note, Ward v. Rock Against Racism: Reasonable Regulations and
State Sponsored Sound, 10 PACE L. Rev. 633 (1990). How about a limited or non-
public forum? Which standard applies to such restrictions? Must the government
exhibit a compelling, significant or legitimate interest? (Language can be found
advocating each standard.) In what context does the least restrictive alternative
apply?
45. 109 S.Ct. 2746 (1989). In a six to three decision, Justice Kennedy's opinion
was joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor and Scalia; Justice Blackmun
concurred in the judgment.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2750 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 3).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2750.
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RAR dropped the suit and a permit was issued. Pursuant to the
agreement, the city developed use guidelines which specified that
the city would "furnish high quality sound equipment and retain an
independent, experienced sound technician for all performances at
the Bandshell." °
Upon learning it would be expected to comply with the guide-
lines for its 1986 concert, RAR returned to the District Court to file a
motion for an injunction against enforcement of the guidelines. In
May of 1986, the District Court responded by preliminarily en-
joining enforcement of the sound amplification guidelines. Alone
among that season's performers, RAR used its own sound equipment
and technician. The 1986 concert, however, again generated com-
plaints about excessive noise.51
The District Court heard the case in 1987 and upheld the city's
guidelines as valid time, place and manner restrictions. The Second
Circuit reversed on the theory that "the method and extent of such
regulation must be reasonable, that is, it must be the least intrusive
upon the freedom of expression as is reasonably necessary to
achieve a legitimate purpose of the regulation." 2 The Supreme
Court, however, disagreed. Justice Kennedy, writing for the major-
50. Id. at 2751. The pertinent part of the Use Guidelines provides:
"To provide the best sound for all events Department of Parks and Recreation has
leased a sound amplification system designed for the specific demands of the Cen-
tral Park Bandhell. To insure appropriate sound quality balanced with respect for
nearby residential neighbors and the mayorally decreed quiet zone of Sheep
Meadow, all sponsors may use only the Department of Parks and Recreation Sound
System.
DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION IS TO BE THE SOLE AND
ONLY PROVIDER OF SOUND AMPLIFICATION, INCLUDING THOUGH NOT
LIMITED TO AMPLIFIERS, SPEAKERS, MONITORS, MICROPHONES, AND
PROCESSORS.
"Clarity of sound results from a combination of amplification equipment and a
sound technician's familiarity and proficiency with that system. Department of
Parks and Recreation will employ a professional sound technician [who] will be
fully versed in sound bounce patterns, daily air currents, and sound skipping within
the Park. The sound technician must also consider the Bandshell's proximity to
Sheep Meadow, activities at Bethesda Terrace, and the New York City Department
of Environmental Protection recommendations." Id. at 2751-52 n. 2.
51. Rock Against Racism, 109 S.Ct. at 2752.
52. Id. (quoting Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1988)).
The Circuit Court suggested pulling the plug on the sound equipment as a less
restrictive alternative, but as discussed infra , this proved to be impracticable. 848
F. 2d. at 372 n. 6; see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
The Second Circuit relied on the test enunciated by the O'Brien Court. In O'Brien,
the Court upheld an ordinance that punished knowing destruction or mutilation of
draft cards. Their analysis included a version of the least restrictive alternative test:
"[the regulation is justified if] the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." 391 U.S
at 377.
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ity, took issue with the Second Circuit's reasoning and set down to
rectify what he believed to be their reversible error.
B. The Law: A Dissonant Chord
Justice Kennedy's initial comments track the analytical framework
of traditional public forum doctrine cases. Indeed, the majority spe-
cifically decided the case as one in which the Bandshell is a tradi-
tional public forum. As such, they stated that the government's right
to regulate expression is subject to first amendment protection. Ken-
nedy then reiterated the familiar test:
even in a public forum the government may impose reason-
able restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected
speech, provided the restrictions "are justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tai-
lored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information."5
3
Justice Kennedy then applied each part of the test in turn. Here,
he found the regulation to be content-neutral because the city's
main justification for the sound-amplification guideline was the "de-
sire to control noise levels at Bandshell events, [retain] the character
of the Sheep Meadow,5 4 and [avoid] undue intrusion into residential
areas .... "' Great care had been taken by the city's attorneys to
avoid the content-based category. By offering consistently neutral
reasons for the regulation, the city escaped a strict scrutiny stan-
dard, thereby easing their burden of proof.
Similarly, the ample alternatives prong of the test proved to be
nothing more than a paper tiger.5 6 In fact, the majority admitted
that the requirement is easily met.97 In comparison to other regula-
tions this Court has upheld, the use guideline was found by the ma-
jority to be far less restrictive ss In fact, the guideline permitted
53. Id. at 2753. (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at
293); see Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. 452 U.S.
640, 648 (1981).
54. The Mayor, by municipal ordinance, has decreed this park area a quiet
zone.
55. 109 S.Ct. at 2754. "The only other justification offered [by the court] below
was the city's interest in 'ensur[ing] the quality of sound at Bandshell events.'" The
Court found this interest to be content-neutral as well because the city's concern
extends only to sound amplification and avoidance of problems associated with in-
adequate sound mix. Id.
56. Id. at 2760. The majority saved this prong for last, but disposed of it post
haste.
57. Id.
58. Id. Compare Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483-84 (1988)(upholding
town ordinance which prohibited picketing at the residence of any individual in the
town) and Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295
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expressive activity in the Bandshell, but had no effect on the quan-
tity or content of that expression beyond regulating the extent of
amplification. 9 Since the guideline did not close down the forum,
the Court held that ample alternatives for communication re-
mained. 6° The real issue, therefore, was whether the use guideline
was narrowly tailored to further the city's substantial interest.
The Second Circuit had concluded that the sound-amplification
guideline was not narrowly tailored to further the city's substantial
interest because it was not the least intrusive means of regulating the
volume.6 1 Justice Kennedy responded unequivocally that the "less-
restrictive-alternative analysis ... has never been a part of the in-
quiry into the validity of time, place, and manner regulation."62 In-
stead, Kennedy forcefully argued that time, place or manner
restrictions are not invalid "simply because there is some imagina-
ble alternative that might be less burdensome on speech. ' 63 Here,
the fact that the city could have regulated the sound short of impos-
ing use of their equipment and technician did not make the regula-
tion invalid.
The significance of this case lies in the debate over the applicabil-
ity of the "less-restrictive-alternative" analysis. In a larger sense, the
dispute highlights the overarching problem with the public forum
doctrine itself. What level of scrutiny shall control in forums, public
and otherwise? Specifically, to what standard will the Court hold
time, place or manner restrictions in public forums? That is the es-
sence of the problem and the answer has consistently eluded the
Supreme Court.
The majority appears to recognize the contorted nature of the law.
However, at a threshold level, Kennedy's opinion suffers from the
malady plaguing the Court, past and present. Within a three page
span, the majority articulates the requisite governmental interest
four times.6 ' Unfortunately, they identify three different standards.
Initially, Justice Kennedy stated that the city's regulation must serve
a significant governmental interest.65 Then, he pointed to the city's
(1984)(upholding application of Park Service regulation which permitted camping
only in designated areas to prevent demonstrators' sleeping in symbolic tents er-
ected with permit for demonstration to call attention to the plight of the homeless).
59. 109 S.Ct. at 2760.
60. Id.
61. 848 F.2d at 370-72.
62. 109 S.Ct. at 2757 (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc. 468 U.S. 641, 657 (1984)).
63. Id. (quoting United States v. Abertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985). Justice
Kennedy concluded that this least-intrusive-means requirement came from United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), where the Court upheld a statute
prohibiting individuals from defacing, mutilating, or destroying their draft cards.
64. 109 S.Ct. at 2756-58.
65. Id. at 2756. (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at
293.)
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substantial interest in ensuring its citizens' enjoyment of whatever
the city parks have to offer.66 In a final reaffirmation of the time,
place or manner analysis, Justice Kennedy referred to the govern-
ment's legitimate content-neutral interests.67 These three standards
rarely, if ever, have been interpreted as equivalents by the courts;
therefore, it is understandable why confusion remains. 68 The major-
ity here did nothing analytically unusual; rather they relied on pre-
cedent and language from good case law. It is a telling indictment
of the cases which allowed this constitutional imbroglio to persist.
Regardless of their treatment of the necessary governmental inter-
est, the majority proceeded to whittle away authority for the less-
restrictive-alternative argument. Justice Kennedy first used Regan v.
Time, Inc. 69 to impeach the less-restrictive-alternative theory's valid-
ity. As mentioned in Regan, the Court refuted the notion that this
theory had ever been part of the inquiry regarding the validity of
time, place, and manner regulation.70 Interestingly enough, Justices
Brennan and Marshall dissented in Regan partially because the sub-
stantial government interest aimed at the prevention of counterfeit-
ing "could be sufficiently served by measures less destructive of
First Amendment interests."7" Here, in Rock Against Racism, Justice
Marshall in dissent pointed out that the majority in Regan com-
manded the votes of only three other Justices, and therefore should
not be construed as the Court's definitive explication of the nar-
rowly tailored requirement.72
Narrow tailoring, according to Rock Against Racism's majority, is
satisfied "so long as the... regulation promotes a substantial gov-
66. Id. at 2757. Apparently, Justice Kennedy took this standard from Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 296.
67. Id. at 2757-58. The irony here is Kennedy's introduction: "Lest any confu-
sion on this point remain, we reaffirm today that a regulation of the time, place, or
manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's
legitimate content-neutral interests... " Id. Later, he reiterated that the city had a
"legitimate governmental interest." Id. at 2759.
68. See infra note 82.
69. 468 U.S. 641 (1984).
70. In Regan, the Court upheld a federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 504) regulating
the photographing of money for use in a magazine cover. The statute really
amounted to an anti-counterfeiting statute. The publisher of Sports Illustrated
brought the suit when federal agents informed Time, Inc.'s legal department that
the illustration on the cover of the February 16, 1981, issue of Sports Illustrated
violated federal law and that it would be necessary for the Secret Service to seize
all plates and materials used for production of the cover. Id. at 646.
Justice White, writing for a plurality, held Section 504's purpose requirement
(used only for philatelic, numismatic, educational, historical, or newsworthy pur-
poses) to be unconstitutional. He upheld, however, the remaining portions of the
statute imposing color and size limitations. Id. at 659.
71. Id. at 686 (quoting Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444
U.S. 620, 636 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
72. Rock Against Racism, 109 S.Ct. at 2761, n. 2.
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erment interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation."" This language, which appeared in United States v.
Albertini,74 further reduced the scrutiny applied to a regulation to
ascertain whether it passes the narrow tailoring requirement. The
State's resulting burden therefore is less difficult to meet. Justice
Marshall distinguished Albertini on the ground that a military base
is not a place traditionally dedicated to freedom of expression.7 5 In
Albertini, Justice O'Connor contested the notion that the power of a
commanding officer to exclude civilians from his base should be an-
alyzed in the same manner as government regulation of a traditional
public forum.76 If true, then the majority's reliance on Albertini
seems somewhat misplaced.
The majority in Rock Against Racism did caution that narrow tai-
loring does not permit time, place or manner regulations to burden
substantially more speech than necessary." This statement is
loosely derived from language in Frisby v. Schultz which states that
a "statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more
than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy."17 8  Coupled
with their view of Albertini's "absent the regulation" language, this
Court's interpretation of Frisby's "source of evil" test effectively
eviscerates the narrow tailoring standard.
The majority, in truth, argued that the exact source of evil in Rock
Against Racism was the volume. The sound-amplification guide-
73. Id. at 2758 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
In Albertini, the defendant was convicted for illegal entry onto a military base fol-
lowing receipt of a bar letter from the commanding officer. The letter informed the
defendant that he was forbidden from entering the base without written permission
from the commanding officer. Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1382 makes it unlawful to reen-
ter a military base after having been ordered not to by an officer in charge. The
defendant challenged the conviction on three grounds, but especially that his pres-
ence at the base was protected by the first amendment. 472 U.S. at 679. The Court
held that whether or not the base constituted a public forum, the exclusion of the
defendant did not violate the first amendment. Id. at 687.
74. 472 U.S. at 689. Moreover, Kennedy argued in Rock Against Racism that
prior cases clearly held time, place or manner restrictions not to be invalid "simply
because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on
speech." 109 S.Ct. at 2757 (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689).
75. 109 S.Ct. at 2761 n. 2.
76. 472 U.S. at 687. Later in the Albertini opinion, however, O'Connor explic-
itly stated that time, place and manner regulations are not invalid simply because
there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech. Id.
at 688-89.
77. 109 S.Ct. at 2758. See also Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S.Ct. 2495 (1988). In
Frisby, abortion protesters brought suit to enjoin enforcement of a municipal ordi-
nance prohibiting picketing before the dwelling of an individual. The Court held
that the ordinance did not ban all picketing, only that in front of a particular resi-
dent. Therefore, the ordinance was a valid time, place and manner restriction. Id.
at 2502.
78. 108 S.Ct. at 2502 (1988).
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lines focused primarily on the target by imposing the city's techni-
cian upon Bandshell users. Furthermore, it is entirely plausible that
the city's interest in protecting citizens from unwelcome noise and
insuring the quality of sound heard by the listener would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation. The danger here
lies in the precedent Rock Against Racism sets and the implications
it has for the future.
Rock Against Racism's as yet unproven legacy amounts to what
Justice Marshall referred to as a sacrifice of free speech. While the
majority argued that content-neutral restrictions do not merit the
strict scrutiny traditionally associated with first amendment free-
doms, 79 the question arises whether time, place or manner restric-
tions that only incidentally burden speech warrant minimal scrutiny.
Apparently, Justice Kennedy and the majority think it does.80 Their
position defies the historical bases of the public forum doctrine,"1 as
well as certain recognized norms in constitutional legal theory.
-8 2
The cause for alarm may be premature, but the case invites observ-
ers to ask - at what price regulation?
III. ROCK AGAINST RACISM'S IMPACT ON
YESTERDAY: A LOOK AT SCHNEIDER v. STATE
THROUGH TODAY'S SPECTACLES
Few would argue here that the result the Court reached is incor-
rect. RAR's behavior (evident in the record) virtually forced the city
to police their concerts from backstage. At numerous intervals, a
different response by RAR might have avoided the need for this case
ever to be adjudicated, much less to be the subject of a Supreme
Court decision.8 3 Moreover, the more drastic measure of shutting
79. Marshall, in dissent, admits this much in Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence, but there he challenged the practice of giving content-neutral regulations
only minimal scrutiny. 468 U.S. at 313. In Rock Against Racism, Marshall takes a
more affirmative stance arguing that the "least restrictive means" test is, in fact, part
of the time, place and manner inquiry. 109 S.Ct. at 2760.
80. But see Martin, 319 U.S. at 147-48 (invalidating a ban on handbill distribu-
tion, notwithstanding that it was the most effective means of serving the government
interest); see also Schneider, 308 U.S at 162.
81. See supra notes 6-11.
82. The terms "significant" or "substantial" interests usually are associated with
an intermediate standard of scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (Oklahoma statute prohibiting sale of beer to males under age of 21 held
invalid). Further, common sense dictates that the narrowly tailored requirement
should consist of something more than minimal scrutiny (rational basis test). See,
e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976)(City ordinance exempting
certain vendors from a pushcart prohibition held valid as rationally related to a
legitimate state interest).
83. BAR could have lowered the volume when city officials first requested them
to do so. Again, lowering the volume would have solved the problem when the city
issued citations during the concert. Finally, given that BAR freely used the Band-
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off the power left city officials facing a riot.84 In addition, no other
group performing at the Bandshell complained about the guide-
lines' restrictions."
The majority in Rock Against Racism dismissed the dissent's anal-
ogy comparing the sound-amplification guideline to a total ban on
distribution of handbills. In doing so, they ignored the case's poten-
tial ramifications, thereby sounding the death knell of the less-re-
strictive-alternative analysis. Its demise takes on significance when
the majority's test is applied to the facts of a prior case. As dis-
cussed in Schneider v. State involved a New Jersey city ordinance
proscribing the distribution of literature by the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses.86 , The Court there found the ordinance invalid because it
struck at "the very heart of constitutional guarantees. "87
But suppose Justice Kennedy wrote that opinion in Justice Roberts'
stead. Since Schneider concerned distribution in the streets, as-
sume for present purposes that a traditional public forum exists. Jus-
tice Kennedy would begin by enunciating the familiar test:
restrictions of this kind are valid provided they are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest and they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.
Following Rock Against Racism, this ordinance appears content-
neutral because the city of Irvington only sought to regulate the
manner in which the literature was distributed. In fact, the content
of the message never received consideration because the ordinance
was "aimed at protecting occupants and others from disturbance
and annoyance and preventing unknown strangers from visiting
houses by day and night."8 8
The next stage in the analysis requires that the ordinance be nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. In accord
shell in 1986 due to the injunction prohibiting enforcement of the city's use guide-
lines, a prudent course would have been discreet monitoring of the volume
controls by RAR during their concerts. 109 S.Ct. at 2750-52.
84. Id. at 2750.
85. Id. at 2752. See Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 658 F.Supp. 1346, 1352
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
86. The ordinance in part stated:
"No person except as in this ordinance provided shall canvass, solicit, distribute
circulars, or other matter, or call from house to house in the Town of Irvington
without first having reported to and received a written permit from the Chief of
Police or the officer in charge of Police Headquarters.. ." Schneider, 308 U.S. at
157-58.
The ordinance is more complex than the part reproduced here, making it
strongly resemble a prior restraint, but for the purposes of the hypothetical offered
it suffices.
87. 308 U.S. at 164.
88. Id. at 159. In other words, the city sought to prevent fraudulent solicitation.
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with his analysis in Rock Against Racism, Justice Kennedy would
first consider the government interest at stake. Although either a
legitimate or substantial interest might apply, the majority would
hold that Irvington's interest must be substantial. Here, Irvington
satisfies the requirement because it has a substantial interest in pro-
moting the public safety, health, and welfare. The restriction there-
fore serves this interest because homeowners will only deal with
canvassers previously licensed by city police. This insures the
homeowner against random strangers soliciting door to door and in-
creases the safety of the neighborhoods.
Of critical importance is the next stage of the analysis - the nar-
row tailoring requirement. Justice Kennedy, to be consistent with
Rock Against Racism, would argue that this ordinance is not invalid
simply because there is some imaginable alternative less burden-
some on speech. 9 Further, narrow tailoring would be satisfied "so
long as the regulation promotes a substantial government interest
that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation."
9 0
The Court would issue a final warning - the regulation may not
burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the
governmental interest. 9 1
The court in Schneider held that frauds and trespasses may be
punished by law. "If it is said that these means are less efficient and
convenient than [the regulation at issue], the answer is that consider-
ations of this sort do not empower a municipality to abridge freedom
of speech and press."9 2 Justice Kennedy, however, would hold
differently.
Under Rock Against Racism's test, the ordinance in Schneider
89. 109 S.Ct. at 2757.
90. Id. at 2758 (citing U.S. v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
91. Id.
92. 308 U.S. at 164. It is true that the Court in Schneider focused on the power
of the Irvington police to censor handbills, yet the ordinance did not empower po-
lice to censor on the basis of the pamphlet's content. Rather, a canvasser was re-
quired to:
make an application giving his name, address, age, height, weight,
place of birth, whether or not previously arrested or convicted of crime, by
whom employed, address of employer, clothing worn, and description of
project for which he is canvassing; that each applicant shall be finger-
printed and photographed; that the Chief of Police shall refuse a permit in
all cases where the application... shows that the canvasser is not of good
character or is canvassing for a project not free from fraud; that canvass-
ing may only be done between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.; that the canvasser must
furnish a photograph of himself which is to be attached to the permit; that
the permittee must exhibit the permit to any [police officer] upon request,
must be courteous to all persons in canvassing, must not importune or an-
noy the town's inhabitants or conduct himself in an unlawful manner and
must, at the expiration of the permit, surrender it at police headquarters.
Id. at 157-58.
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would survive challenge even though a less burdensome alternative
exists (remedy at law). Moreover, it is enough that the city demon-
strates that their interest would be served less effectively absent the
regulation. The city would merely point to the fact that their sub-
stantial interest in preventing fraudulent solicitation cannot be
achieved as effectively absent the licensing procedure at the police
station. The remedy at law against offenders, while less burdensome
on speech, would defeat the interest to be served - protection
against fraudulent solicitation - because the offense already will
have occurred. Finally, the ordinance only requires canvassers to
obtain a permit at police headquarters. Since they retain the right to
distribute their literature, the ordinance would not substantially bur-
den more speech than is necessary to protect the homeowner from
fraudulent solicitation.
The final prong of the analysis requires that the ordinance leave
open ample alternative channels of communication. Here, Rock
Against Racism's majority would find that the ordinance continues
to permit expressive activity and has no effect on the content of ex-
pression beyond regulating when canvassing may occur and the
manner in which it will be done.9 3 Furthermore, canvassers cannot
contend that a barrier would exist to delivering their religious
message to the media, or to the public by other means. 4 In truth,
they still can resort to distribution in the streets or other forms of
communication to convey their message.
While the comparison between Schneider and Rock Against Ra-
cism may not land on all fours, both situations involve a city ordi-
nance that places content-neutral discretion over expression in the
hands of municipal officials. In each case, the ordinance serves a
significant governmental interest; the former protects against fraud-
ulent solicitation while the latter seeks to reduce noise and insure
the sound quality of the Bandhell concerts. Furthermore, both
cases leave the desired form of expression intact, albeit subject to
regulation. Schneider's canvassers may still solicit door-to-door and
Rock Against Racism's performers retain their right to utilize the
Bandshell. The only meaningful distinction concerns how narrowly
the ordinance at issue is tailored.
In Schneider, the Court sacificed efficiency for free speech,
whereas Rock Against Racism's Court did the exact opposite. The
tacit nod the majority gave to music's expressive value in Rock
Against Racism underscores the Court's nascent disregard for the
lessons of history. Why pay homage to the historical role of music
as expression and decry the totalitarian fear of free speech, if the
Court only proceeds to slowly emasculate constitutional sae-
93. See Rock Against Racism, 109 S.Ct. at 2760.
94. See Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 295; Heffron v. In-
ternational Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654-55 (1981).
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guards?9" Dissenting, Justice Marshall sounded the alarm,96 dog-
gedly defending the viability of the "less-restrictive-alternative"
analysis. His argument persuaded only two out of nine, leaving the
majority comfortably positioned to install their version of the time
place or manner analysis.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court sits at the crossroads of the public forum. On
its present course, Rock Against Racism represents a sword in gov-
ernment's hands poised to strike deftly at first amendment free-
doms.97 The Court, however, may anticipate the coming blow and
disarm government. 98
The majority in Rock Against Racism need not have refuted the
less-restrictive-alternative analysis. For content-neutral cases, this
analysis is "relevant to deciding whether government has in fact left
too little opportunity for communicative activity."99 A key to mak-
ing a determination is whether the government's goals can be effec-
tively and less intrusively served. 1°° To be effective, an alternative
must first be available; that is, it must exist. Second, it must be a
95. 109 S.Ct. at 2753.
96. Id. at 2760-63.
97. Arguably, the quartering already has begun. See United States v. Kokinda,
110 S.Ct. 3115 (1990). Here, the Court, in a plurality opinion by Justice
O'Connor, recently upheld a regulation prohibiting exercise of first amendment
freedoms on a post office sidewalk.
98. Some may query whether Rock Against Racism's new standard indeed fore-
shadows future governmental infringement of speech; especially given the Court's
decision in Texas v. Johnson, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (1989), the flag-burning case. There,
the Court (in an opinion by Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
and Scalia, and concurred in by Justice Kennedy) struck down a Texas statute
which prohibited desecration of the American flag. While the Johnson case indi-
cates the Court's regard for free speech, it does little to allay the anxiety generated
by Rock Against Racism, primarily because the cases were decided under different
analyses.
The Johnson case is a classic example of Tribe's track-one analysis - regulation
based upon the content of speech. As such, the regulation is subjected to strict
scrutiny. In contrast, Rock Against Racism was decided on track-two - content-
neutral restrictions. Once a restriction is deemed content-neutral, it must be nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant government interest that leaves open ample
alternatives to communicate. See Tribe at 977-86.
Justification for each track turns on the burdens placed on speech. Track one
employs strict scrutiny because content-based regulations threaten the speaker's
right to speak at all. Time, place or manner restrictions, however, only regulate the
way in which speakers express their message. Consequently, speech subject to
such restrictions, while still under the first amendment analytical rubric, receive
less protection than other types of speech. Id. Therefore, removal of the "less re-
strictive alternative" prong of the test further dilutes an already watered down con-
stitutional standard.
99. Tribe at 985.
100. 109 S.Ct. at 2762.
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viable option; the alternative must have utility for whomever consid-
ers its use. Although Justice Marshall, in dissent, identified a
number of alternatives as less intrusive,10 1 most, if not all, are im-
practicable.1 0 2 Therefore, the least restrictive alternative available
to the city was the one it employed.10 3
Aside from this, the Court must resolve the standard of scrutiny to
be applied to content-neutral time, place or manner restrictions. As
constitutional theory has evolved over time, the courts have devel-
oped three standards of scrutiny to be applied in specific situa-
tions. 10 4  Since each standard has two components, nine
combinations exist.' 0 5 Based on the many Court cases within and
101. In an amicus brief, the National Park Service set forth the methods it uses to
control volume, which, according to Marshall, were rejected by the city. Id. at
2762 n. 5. In fact, the city tried each one with no success. The recalcitrance RAR
demonstrated removes sound monitoring on the event's perimeter and communica-
tion with event sponsors from the schedule of alternatives. Similarly, turning the
power off resulted in a potential riot and is therefore not a feasible option. See
supra notes 46-51.
102. The only alternative not fully explored by the city concerned an anti-noise
ordinance which it has chosen not to enforce. The threshold problem with the ordi-
nance is that the violation must occur prior to enforcement. Thus, the city's resi-
dents will be subjected to the noise before any relief is provided. The solution,
therefore, defeats the purpose. Furthermore, RAR did not act accordingly even
after it received two citations during the concert. Their actions indicated that en-
forcement of the ordinance may have little or no impact on BAR's behavior in the
future. 109 S.Ct. at 2750.
103. This author does not argue that Rock Against Racism was decided incor-
rectly, merely that the majority need not have thrown out the "less restrictive al-
tertative" requirement. For discussion of the former, see Note, Flag Burning Yes,
Loud Music No: What's the Catch?, 44 U. Miami L. Rev. 1033, 1053-73 (1990);
Note, Ward v. Rock Against Racism: Reasonable Regulations and State Sponsored
Sound, 10 Pace L. Rev. 633 (1990).
104. The equal protection/discrimination cases, where the court identified the
characteristics of a suspect class, contributed a great deal to the development of
the three-tier scrutiny analysis. The three standards provide that the governmental
ordinance, activity or classification must:
(1) for strict scrutiny, be necessary to accomplish a compelling governmental
interest, see, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S.Ct. 1879 (1984);
(2) for intermediate scrutiny, bear a substantial relationship to an important
government interest, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
(3) for minimal scrutiny, be rationally related to a legitimate state interest, see,
e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam).
105. Possible combinations:
(1) Necessary for compelling state interest.
(2) Necessary for important state interest.
(3) Necessary for legitimate state interest.
(4) Substantial relationship to compelling state interest.
(5) Substantial relationship to important state interest.
(6) Substantial relationship to legitimate state interest.
(7) Rational relationship to compelling state interest.
(8) Rational relationship to important state interest.
(9) Rational relationship to legitimate state interest.
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without the public forum doctrine that employ a scrutiny standard,
choosing the correct one nearly amounts to throwing the dice or
flipping a coin.
Apart from indecision concerning the requisite governmental in-
terest, the majority in Rock Against Racism appeared to rely on a
test which combined a strict scrutiny component with that of the in-
termediate variety.'" 8 Although narrow tailoring is arguably a strict
scrutiny standard, the version that emerged from this case is
equivalent to minimal scrutiny.' °7 The Court seems to be correct in
holding that content-neutral time, place or manner restrictions were
never intended to be strictly scrutinized.1 e However, neither
should they only receive minimal scrutiny. The simple answer to
this dilemma is to adopt the intermediate standard.
By holding that regulations ought to bear a substantial relation-
ship to an important government interest, the Court avoids strict
scrutiny, but simultaneously safeguards free speech to the extent
that a regulation must be more than merely rationally related. It is
quite apparent from the cases that the distinction between a compel-
ling state interest and a legitimate state interest is a red herring. If
the Court chooses to apply strict scrutiny, the state interest, more
than likely, will be found compelling. Similarly, minimal scrutiny, in
all probability, will result in a determination that the state interest is
legitimate. Therefore, of paramount importance is the gloss given
the first component.
Assuming that narrow tailoring is tantamount to a substantial rela-
tionship, Rock Against Racism's potential erosion of first amend-
ment freedoms need not occur. It permits the Court here to reach
the same conclusion, yet prevents facile manipulation of the lan-
guage by government. No longer would the Court be inclined to
state that a time, place or manner restriction is valid if, absent the
regulation, the government interest is achieved less effectively.
Applied to the facts of Rock Against Racism, the Court still could
hold that the regulation is valid because it exhibits a substantial re-
106. "[Nlarrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest .... 109
S.Ct. at 2752 (citing Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 370 (2d Cir.
1988) (cite omitted). Common sense dictates that a substantial interest is more akin
to an important state interest than a legitimate state interest. See Tribe at 984.
107. "It will be enough... that the challenged regulation advances the govern-
ment's interest only in the slightest, for any differential burden on speech that re-
sults does not enter the calculus." 109 S.Ct. at 2762 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. See Tribe at 981-82. " '[P]ublic forums' represent areas within which toler-
ance for inhibitions on speech, petition, and assembly is at a minimum, and govern-
ment's burden of justification [is] at its highest ... [However], [u]nless the inhibition
resulting from... a content-neutral abridgement is significant, government need
show no more than a rational justification for its choice .... Id.
The inherent tension between these two statements is obvious, but they perfectly
frame the dilemma in which the Court presently finds itself cornered.
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lationship to an important government interest. In other words, the
city's interest in noise control and insuring the sound quality would
be furthered substantially by the sound-amplification guidelines.10 9
Nevertheless, the city's burden would involve more than satisfaction
of the rationality test.110
It is true that the Court, as yet, has not developed consistent terms
defining intermediate scrutiny, much less what constitutes a substan-
tial relationship. At the very least, the government's burden should
be more than minimal because first amendment freedoms, even inci-
dentally burdened, merit greater protection than those afforded by a
rationally related regulation. Here, the Court may find articulation
of a concise standard onerous, but the alternative is a gradually taci-
turn marketplace of ideas. Even the most conservative on the Court
today acknowledge the danger of a less vital marketplace. By fur-
ther restricting the open exchange of ideas, we fetter the essence of
freedom and lose an opportunity for expression in an already finite
galaxy of forums. How much speech will be lost before the Court is
forced to ask itself - at what price regulation?
Michael B. Manley*
109. While the Court at times questioned the wisdom of further dividing the
levels of scrutiny into three-tiers, the case law adopting that approach has lead to
the three tiers becoming relatively entrenched. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976).
110. The rationality test, traditionally applied to economic regulations in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause, employs disturbingly permissive language.
Generally, the legislature "may ... adopt[] regulations that only partially amelio-
rate a perceived evil and deferlj complete elimination of the evil to future regula-
tions." City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)(per curiam). An
older case is still cited with approval by the Supreme Court as articulating the ele-
ments of a rational basis test. For present purposes they may be stated in the follow-
ing form:
(1) A regulation is valid unless "it is without any reasonable basis and therefore
is purely arbitrary";
(2) A regulation "having some reasonable basis does not offend . .. merely
because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in
some inequality";
(3) When a regulation is called into question, "if any state of facts reasonably
can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time
the law was enacted must be assumed... ".
See generally, Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
* The author would like to thank Kevin J. McGill, Esq.; Partner, Clifton, Budd
& DeMaria. His expertise in the area of first amendment law inspired this note.

